The head of the United Nations nuclear watchdog told the Security Council on Tuesday, October 27, that there is no indication Iran has tried to repair or rebuild the nuclear facilities damaged in United States and Israeli military strikes in 2025 and 2026. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Rafael Grossi said the agency had found no such activity since June 2025, even as he pressed Tehran to restore full access for inspectors.
“Since June 2025, we have not identified any activity to repair or reconstruct any of the facilities damaged in the military attacks of 2025 and 2026,” Grossi said during the Security Council meeting in New York.
Key Takeaways
- The IAEA says it has found no repair or reconstruction at Iran’s damaged nuclear facilities since June 2025.
- Inspectors still cannot verify the status of Iran’s stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium, because access to damaged sites has not been restored.
- Grossi urged Iran to allow inspectors into all of its nuclear sites, saying verification would be essential to any agreement on its nuclear programme.
What Grossi told the Security Council
Grossi’s briefing came as the Security Council discussed Iran’s nuclear programme and its non-proliferation obligations. The meeting was requested by Bahrain, Denmark, Latvia, France, Britain and the United States, according to reporting of the session.
He told Council members that the IAEA has been unable to verify the status of Iran’s stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium since the United States bombed Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025. Iran has since denied inspectors access to the affected facilities, leaving the agency without a confirmed account of how much material remains and where it is held.
Before the June 2025 strikes, the IAEA said Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity. That level is a short technical step from the roughly 90 percent enrichment generally considered weapons grade, although enrichment alone does not by itself amount to a weapon.
The gap between what the agency can see and what it can verify is now the central problem.
The gap between what the agency can see and what it can verify is now the central problem. Grossi said routine inspection activity in Iran has not resumed, except at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, and that inspection teams have been unable to return to damaged sites for months because of safety concerns. He also pointed to restricted access to the Isfahan fuel enrichment plant, which Iran had declared shortly before the military attacks.
Why the assessment matters now
The assessment arrives at a sensitive moment. US President Donald Trump has said that preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons was a major reason for the war with Iran that began on February 28, 2026. He has also repeatedly claimed that the US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites in June 2025 “obliterated” the country’s atomic programme.
Grossi’s statement does not settle that claim, but it does draw a line between damage and rebuilding. Finding no reconstruction activity is not the same as confirming that a programme has ended, because without access to damaged sites the agency cannot fully verify the condition of facilities or the fate of the uranium stockpile.
The briefing also sits alongside warnings of a possible renewed campaign after the US midterms and earlier reports of US forces preparing for action, which have kept regional tensions high. Against that background, the IAEA’s call for access is both a technical request and a diplomatic one: verification, Grossi argued, would be essential to any agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme.
- No repair or reconstruction detected at damaged facilities since June 2025, according to the IAEA.
- Iran’s 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, reported before the June 2025 strikes, remains unverified.
- Routine inspections have not resumed, except at the Bushehr plant.
- Iran maintains that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes, while the IAEA is seeking full access to confirm that account.
The verification problem in plain terms
Verification depends on presence. Inspectors need to enter facilities, take measurements, check seals and compare what they find with what a country has declared. When access is blocked, the agency can monitor from outside and use satellite imagery and other information, but it cannot close the book on material that may have been moved, buried or damaged in ways that are not visible from outside.
That is why Grossi’s two messages belong together. The first is reassuring in a narrow sense: the agency sees no rebuilding work under way. The second is a warning: without inspectors on the ground, the agency cannot confirm the full picture, and that uncertainty itself becomes a source of tension, especially while regional tensions around Iran talks continue.
The White House did not immediately respond to requests for comment on Grossi’s remarks on Tuesday evening, according to reporting of the session. Iran, for its part, maintains that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes.
What to Watch Next
What happens next depends largely on access. If Iran restores inspectors’ access to all of its nuclear sites, including those damaged in the attacks, the IAEA could begin to verify the condition of facilities and the status of the uranium stockpile. If access remains restricted, the gap between what the agency can see and what it can verify will remain, and the Security Council debate over Iran’s obligations is likely to continue. Any agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, Grossi has said, would depend on that verification.